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Summary
In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act devolved significant 
new powers to individual states for implementing ‘Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families’ (TANF). States could contract out all services, including eligibility for TANF 
financial assistance, and give contracts to faith-based organisations on a new 
basis (known as ‘charitable choice’). 
This report contains findings from a review of literature on the contracting out 
of these welfare to work services, with a particular focus on the experience of 
Wisconsin and New York City. 
Main findings
There has been no comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of contracting out 
welfare to work in the USA but the following findings emerged from survey and 
case study evidence published by various policy institutes and academics and from 
the reports of various audit, oversight and regulatory authorities:
•	 In	2001	nearly	all	states	contracted	out	some	TANF	services	with	a	market	value	
of $1.5 billion, accounting for 13 per cent of federal TANF expenditure. Some 
88 per cent of the total funds contracted by state governments – and 73 per 
cent of the state-level contracts – were with non-profits; the rest with for-profit 
providers. In eight states half of the contracted funds were with for-profits. The 
value of the TANF market has since fallen, reflecting declining caseloads. One 
study found that between 2001 and 2004, the average dollar value of TANF 
contracts fell by 27 per cent and the average number of state contracts from 
121 to 59. There had, however, been an increase in the proportion of contracts 
held by faith-based organisations.
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•	 A	 significant	 minority	 of	 states,	 such	 as	 Wisconsin,	 contracted	 out	 case	
management and eligibility determination to the private sector but most states 
retained public control of TANF eligibility, reorganising their welfare offices to 
provide work-focused eligibility and case management services, but contracted 
with the private sector for other employment-related services. 
•	 There	were	three	types	of	TANF	contracts	–	‘pure	pay-for	performance’,	‘cost-
reimbursement’ and ‘fixed price’. In practice many welfare agencies used ‘hybrid 
contracts’ that sought to balance performance incentives, provider viability and 
the delivery of particular services. Studies reported that staff at contracting 
agencies found designing contracts and managing performance ‘challenging’. 
The implementation process has been dynamic and welfare agencies have had 
to frequently revise the terms of their contracts as problems have arisen and 
conditions have altered. The role of auditors has been particularly important in 
identifying poor contract design and oversight.
•	 There	is	variation	in	the	size	of	contracts.	Many	welfare	agencies	issued	a	significant	
number of smaller contracts that allowed them to acquire specialist providers, 
reduced reliance on large contractors, and enhanced future competition by 
keeping entry costs low. This also reduced the risks from poor performance as a 
weak provider could more easily be replaced. Other welfare agencies, however, 
used a ‘prime contractor’ model. This allowed them to work with fewer, well-
capitalised contractors. Larger contracts limited administrative and monitoring 
costs, allowed contractors to reap economies of scale and gave them scope to 
coordinate services. These contracts attracted for-profits organisations which 
targeted markets with large caseloads.
•	 There	 has	 been	much	 debate	 about	 the	 role	 of	 national	 for-profit	 providers	
and controversy about their operation in particular states, especially in the first 
phase of contracting out. Concerns have also been expressed about the impact 
that welfare to work contracts have had on the composition and service delivery 
of the non-profit sector.
•	Most	studies	report	that	welfare	agencies	attach	importance	to	the	experience	
and opinions of clients. Contacts normally require providers to agree individual 
service plans and meet minimum service standards. To gain more insight into 
the experience of service users many welfare agencies supplement their limited 
on-site monitoring of client experience with customer satisfaction surveys. Some 
carry out surveys with individuals who declined services or were sanctioned.
The evidence review did not consider the merits of the general arguments 
concerning the privatisation of welfare to work services. The concern was with 
the policy and delivery issues emerging from the US welfare market and the 
implications of these findings for the design, regulation and local delivery of the 
emerging British welfare market: 
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1 Contractors and their frontline staff inevitably gain an advantage when 
implementing new contracts as they develop greater operational knowledge 
of how to achieve specified outcomes. The development of a performance 
payment system will involve an evolutionary process of trial and error and is likely 
to require an extended period of monitoring, evaluation and modification. It is 
important also that in addition to agreeing the delivery of specified outcomes, 
contractors agree some general values that will help steer the behaviour of the 
contractor as they make use of the flexibilities they enjoy.
2 There is continuing tension between regulation, transparency and flexibility. As 
the Wisconsin experience illustrates, poor contract design and oversight can 
result in unintended outcomes. Subsequent redesign has now given Wisconsin 
increased control over the performance, governance and service delivery 
of contractors but this has reduced their freedom to innovate. The role of 
independent oversight is important as those with responsibility for policy and 
implementation have a clear interest in the ‘success’ of contracting out. 
3 The US evidence illustrates the importance of contracting agencies 
independently monitoring client experience and ensuring that robust systems 
are in place to respond to complaints of unfair treatment and poor service 
delivery. In many contracted-out federal programmes agencies must conduct 
customer satisfaction surveys and the results, as in Wisconsin, may be used as 
a benchmark performance indicator. These instruments are important both 
because they provide important information on service delivery and because they 
can militate against ‘creaming’ where job-focused performance benchmarks 
might encourage contractors to deliver most to those clients easier to place.
4 There will need to be a significant investment in information systems and 
in contract negotiation and revision. This should include the continuing 
development of skilled contract managers. Contracts need to ensure that 
staff involved in service delivery have appropriate training and development 
opportunities so that they can discharge their responsibilities properly. 
5 The virtues of competition are difficult to sustain if there is competition only 
for contracts. Once a delivery market is established incumbent providers enjoy 
acquired advantages. Contracting agencies face a difficult trade-off between 
the potential improvements that might be gained from a new contractor and 
the transaction costs and service delivery disruption that will arise when holding 
an open competition. The efficiencies of contracting should also be sought 
by creating effective competition between providers within markets. There is, 
however, scant evidence in the literature on how such competition is driven in 
the US welfare market, albeit New York City uses the data from its contractor 
information system to drive the performance of its prime contractors. There 
was also little evidence on empowering clients to exercise choice between 
different welfare providers.
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6 The use of prime contractors reduces administrative costs and generates 
economies of scale but, as the New York case study illustrates, this may be 
at the price of a loss of insight into service delivery, the experience of clients 
and of relationships between the prime and its subcontractors. The viability 
and performance of subcontractors is important both for immediate service 
delivery and as a future source of competition for the prime contract.
7 There are risks attached to the significant involvement of for-profit organisations. 
They are likely to follow profit maximisation strategies shaped by contract 
incentives and this may not necessarily deliver what is best for clients, especially 
for those with greater barriers. Moreover, if the entry of for-profits into local 
delivery systems displaces existing private and public infrastructure, future 
capacity may be at risk when market conditions change and larger for-profits 
remove their capital to seek greater profits elsewhere.
8 Developing and managing contracts for welfare to work and eligibility services 
is a complex and demanding task for administrators and managers. There is 
a sharp and continuous ‘learning curve’ and it takes time to learn how to 
steer the market to minimise perverse incentives and to capture the efficiencies 
and innovation that independent contractors can offer. As one US analyst 
concluded, ‘successful contracting requires government to be smart buyers 
and good contract managers’.
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1 Introduction
The Government has announced a ‘major transformation’ in the delivery of welfare 
to work programmes in which it will ‘learn from international experience’ to best 
‘harness the strengths’ of public, private and third sector provision (DWP, 2007). 
This paper contains findings from a systematic review of literature on the 
contracting out of welfare to work services in the USA. It reflects, in particular, on 
the experience of Wisconsin and New York City since 1996. Wisconsin led the way 
in US welfare reform, was the first to extensively contract out its delivery system, 
and the ‘Wisconsin model’ has been the source of much policy emulation in both 
the USA and in Europe. Outside Milwaukee, the state has used contracts also to 
deliver welfare to work services to a dispersed and relatively small population. 
New York City, by contrast, has the highest welfare population in the USA. Its 
welfare to work delivery system was initially based on the Wisconsin model but 
has undergone significant reform and most services are now contracted out to a 
small network of prime contractors who are paid by results.
This evidence review does not consider the merits of the general arguments 
concerning the privatisation of welfare to work services.1 Its concern is with the 
policy and delivery issues that emerged from the design of contracts, payment for 
performance, the use of prime contractors, and the impact on services, especially 
for those ‘hardest to place’. It considers organisational and resource challenges 
that government agencies have encountered in managing contracted-out services 
and the implications of these findings for the design, regulation and local delivery 
of the emerging British welfare market. 
2 The literature
There has been no comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of contracting out 
welfare to work services in the USA. There is, however, survey and case study 
evidence from various policy institutes and academics and findings from audit, 
oversight and regulatory authorities. Interest groups have also published extensively 
on the privatisation of welfare services. Proponents argue that private contractors 
bring innovation and new capacity to service delivery and that competition and 
payment for performance generates efficiencies and cost savings. Officials involved 
in welfare to work services delivery stress that contracting out enabled them to 
speedily and flexibly expand capacity and restructure delivery systems (including, 
where required, the ability to renegotiate contracts). Critics dispute the idea that 
the conditions for effective competition exist in the delivery of welfare programmes 
and deem efficiencies and savings claimed as illusory. They contend that transaction 
and contract management costs have increased after contracts were awarded and 
that welfare agencies have had to remedy unforeseen deficiencies in the services 
delivered by providers. 
1 For general reviews of US evidence and literature on privatisation of welfare 
and social services see Nightingale and Pindus, 1997, and Winston et al., 
2002.
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3 The contemporary US welfare market
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act (1996) and its TANF 
programme enabled US states to lead in the design and delivery of welfare to 
work programmes. TANF eligibility was limited to five years, with states required 
to engage an increasing proportion of adult recipients, mostly lone parents, in 
work or work-related activities as a condition for cash assistance. States could 
contract out all services, including eligibility for TANF financial assistance, and 
give contracts to faith-based organisations on a new basis (known as ‘charitable 
choice’). In 1997 Congress also created the $3 billion Welfare-to-Work grant 
programme, providing additional resources for employment and job retention 
services for hard-to-employ welfare recipients.
Most states retained public control of TANF eligibility, reorganising their welfare 
offices to provide work-focused eligibility and case management services but 
contracted with the private sector for other services. A significant minority of 
states, such as Wisconsin, also contracted out case management and eligibility 
determination to the private sector. Eligibility determination for other federal 
income support programmes for poor people, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid, 
must, however, be delivered by public sector agencies.2
Prior to the legislation most contracted service providers were non-profits who 
had previously delivered a variety of services including job preparation and job 
placement services funded by the federal Department of Labor. In 2001/02 the 
federal General Accounting Office (GAO) (now Accountability) undertook a 
comprehensive review of contracting out in TANF. It reported that in 2001 nearly 
all states contracted out some TANF services with a market value of $1.5 billion, 
accounting for 13 per cent of federal TANF expenditure. Some 88 per cent of the 
total funds contracted by state governments – and 73 per cent of the state-level 
contracts – were with non-profits; the rest with for-profit providers (GAO, 2002, 
p.3). In eight states half of the contracted funds were with for-profits. 
In the three years following the GAO study the value of the TANF market fell, 
reflecting declining caseloads. One study found that between 2001 and 2004 
the average dollar value of TANF contracts fell by 27 per cent and the average 
number of state contracts from 121 to 59. There had, however, been an increase 
in the proportion of contracts held by ‘faith-based organisations’ although this 
was concentrated in a relatively small number of states (Jacobsen al, 2005, p.43; 
p.46).
2 Federal rules require state employees to decide eligibility but some time 
limited waivers have been granted and elements of the application and 
delivery process may be contracted out. Food Stamp operations, for example, 
are privatised to varying degrees in 21 states. In the most extensive, and 
controversial, privatisation in Texas, eligibility for Food Stamps, Medicaid and 
other benefits is delivered through private sector call centres with phone and 
online applications.
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Other legislative changes impacted on the welfare market. The Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) (1998) did not relate directly to TANF-funded services but 
created opportunities for collaboration between welfare agencies and workforce 
development services. WIA mandated that access to 18 federal employment 
and training programmes be coordinated through one-stop career centres. In 
some states both TANF and WIA employment and retention services have been 
coordinated and in some cases co-located. Non-profit organisations and private 
companies directly manage some of these career centres (as in Florida) and in most 
states hybrids of public and private consortia deliver traditional public employment 
services (Bersharov and Germainis, 2004). 
On the ground welfare to work services are now contracted out by a range of 
agencies and it is usual to find workforce development agencies contracting out 
services under different federal programmes for similar target groups but with 
different eligibility requirements and funding rules (see the appendix for more on 
‘service integration’).
4 Procurement and contracts 
The procurement of TANF contracts typically involved several phases. After 
development of a state strategy a contracting agency would be charged with 
producing a work plan that outlined the objectives to be met by a contractor 
and how they would meet them. After consultation, sometimes with potential 
contractors, the state or local agency issued a public Request for Proposals (RFP). 
In a detailed study of six states that contracted out case management, Mathmatica 
researchers found considerable variation in the degree of flexibility and prescription 
in RFPs. The aim was often to give contractors the flexibility to innovate but this 
was balanced by requirements that would ensure particular services were delivered 
and standards met. Purchasers also wanted contractors to demonstrate that they 
had undertaken the advance planning required (McConnell et al., 2003, p.3). 
Some contracting agencies made efforts to assist smaller providers to compete 
for contracts by giving detailed information on programme requirements and 
providing tailored feedback on bids.
The GAO (2002) reported that after the receipt of proposals contracting agencies 
evaluated the bids using at least the following criteria: price/cost, staffing, 
experience and technical and/or other resources. Mathmatica found that to 
increase fairness, selection committees were composed of public agency staff often 
with	 independent	citizens	and/or	consultants.	 In	making	decisions	the	 ‘greatest 
number of points generally went to programme design, organisational capacity, 
or past performance’, albeit contractors were subject to pressures to keep costs 
down (McConnell et al., 2003, p.xix). 
The Mathmatica study reported that contracts in their six study sites were for one 
or two years but typically included options for renewal. Contractual performance 
standards involved both outcome and process measures. Outcome measures 
included employment, job retention, earnings and participation in work activities. 
Process measures included enrolments, completion of assessments, accuracy of 
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referrals and, sometimes, staff training. The number of performance measures in 
contracts varied between five and 23.
There	was	variation	too	in	the	size	of	contracts.	Many	welfare	agencies	issued	a	
significant number of smaller contracts that allowed them to acquire specialist 
providers, reduced reliance on large contractors and enhanced future competition 
by keeping entry costs low. This reduced also the risks from poor performance as 
a weak provider could more easily be replaced.
Other welfare agencies, however, used a ‘prime contractor’ model. This allowed 
them to work with fewer, well-capitalised contractors. Larger contracts limited 
administrative and monitoring costs, allowed contractors to reap economies of 
scale and gave them scope to coordinate services. These contracts attracted for-
profits organisations which targeted markets with large caseloads (Bryna Sanger, 
2003). The larger for-profits enjoyed comparative advantage as they could draw 
on existing technology and management systems and deploy specialist staff with 
experience of designing project budgets and preparing effective proposals. 
Mathmatica assessed the relative merits of the three contract types used by welfare 
agencies (McConnell et al., 2003, p.xx):
1 Pure pay-for-performance contracts. Providers were compensated only 
when they achieved specific performance goals, relating to the number of 
clients who achieved certain outcomes, the percentage of clients who met 
performance goals, or both. Pure pay-for-performance contracts were the least 
risky for public agencies and the most risky for service providers, especially 
where contractors were reliant on referrals from welfare offices over which 
they had little control.
2 Cost-reimbursement contracts. Providers received payments for the 
expenses they incurred. Generally, costs were restricted to those approved in a 
budget agreed in the procurement process. Under cost-reimbursement, most 
of the risk was borne by the public agency. Payments had to be made to the 
contractor regardless of the quality and effectiveness of the services, albeit 
they might depend on uncertain fluctuations in referral flows.
3 Fixed-price contracts. Providers were paid an agreed fee regardless of 
performance or the actual cost of providing services. Under fixed-price, the 
public agency and contractor shared the risk. The agency had to make payments 
irrespective of the quality and effectiveness of services but the contractor bore 
the risk that costs could be higher than anticipated.
In practice many welfare agencies used ‘hybrid contracts’ that sought to balance 
performance incentives, provider viability, and the delivery of particular services. An 
example illustrates how a welfare agency sought to combine training that might 
last between three to 12 months, with performance payments for job placement 
and retention. The contractor was paid an enrolment fee but had to incur a 
considerable portion of initial programme costs before receiving performance 
payments ($1,000 on job placement; $400 if the client had health benefits within 
9Contracting out welfare to work in the USA: delivery lessons
six months; and $1,600 if the client was continuously employed for a year). To 
offset the risk incurred in relying on referrals from welfare offices, the contractor 
was guaranteed enrolment payments for at least 75 per cent of the proposed 
entrants (Yates, 1998, p.6). The Mathmatica study reported that even in the 
locality with the highest proportion of pay-for-performance, contractor viability 
was underpinned by a fixed monthly payment of 15 per cent to 25 per cent of 
their budgets, irrespective of their performance (McConnell et al., 2003, p.xxii).
There has been much ‘learning by doing’ in the development of the US welfare 
market. One study reported that in the early phases of contract implementation 
many issues emerged from misunderstandings about expectations, such as, ‘the 
number and nature of clients to be served; what ‘counts’ as a job placement, a 
no-show client, a client contact; access to facilities, data or other agency property; 
payment methodologies and schedules; and reporting requirements’. Poor 
contract design meant the agency might ‘spend the following year dealing with 
contract disputes’. Such disputes were more easily resolved where the agency 
adopted a ‘partnership’ approach with contractors where compliance monitoring 
was supplemented by dialogue and a joint commitment to ensure ‘contract (and 
client) success’ (Yates, 1998, p.2; p.4). In some cases this could involve redesign 
of the contract itself.
5 Contract management, audit and oversight
Whilst service delivery may be contracted-out-welfare agencies and administrators 
remain publicly accountable for service quality and effectiveness, policy compliance 
and the proper use of public funds. To perform this function they must gather 
performance information and monitor service delivery but the benefits from 
such scrutiny must be balanced against the costs they and contractors incur. 
Both the GAO (2002) and Mathmatica’s studies reported that staff at contracting 
agencies found designing contracts and managing procurement and performance 
‘challenging’ and remained on a steep learning curve.
These studies, and others, found that monitoring typically included site visits, 
case file reviews, interviews with clients, performance data analysis and, where 
deficiencies were found, developing and implementing improvement plans. A 
significant task, and investment, across states has been to devise and implement 
information systems that enable agencies to track clients, monitor provider 
performance and verify service delivery and outcomes, especially to secure accurate 
and timely job placement, retention and wage data.
The role of auditors has been particularly important in a context where 
administrators were ‘learning’ and local politicians and contractors had invested 
political and financial capital in the success of their local systems. The GAO study 
(2002) reported that state auditors had identified problems with how some 
welfare agencies procured contracts and how they monitored contractors and 
subcontractors. Audits undertaken in 2000 reported deficiencies in poor monitoring 
in 15 states and in poor oversight or poor procurement in four. The responsible 
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Federal agency (Health and Human Services) responded to such audit reports only 
on an ad hoc basis and had not analysed national trends or developments in 
contracting out. HHS rejected the GAO recommendation that it undertake such 
reviews systematically on grounds of cost and its perception of the devolution 
inscribed in the legislation (GAO, 2002, p.5).3 
6 Providers in the welfare market
A number of studies have investigated the type of contractors that deliver US 
welfare to work services. There are three distinct categories (GAO, 2002; McConnell 
et al., 2003; Bryna Sanger, 2003): 
1 National for-profits: Those identified include Curtis & Associates, Inc.; 
Maximus; America Works; and Affiliated Computer Services, Inc (previously 
Lockheed Martin IMS). They typically hold contracts in multiple states and 
have considerable resources to secure contracts. Two are large corporations 
that provide technology and systems management services for different levels 
of government and deliver other contracted-out social services, such as child 
support collection and enforcement.
2 Local branches of national non-profits: These include faith-based and 
secular organisations, such as, the Salvation Army, YWCA, Catholic Charities 
and Goodwill Industries. The local branches involved in TANF are experienced 
service providers with distinct social purposes and a history of contracting with 
government to deliver a wide range of services. 
3 Local and regional non-profits: These can be faith-based or secular. 
They are typically smaller concerns with more limited access to resources 
and administrative capacity. Some focus their activities on a particular 
neighbourhood, ethnic or client group.
There has been much debate about the role of the national for-profits and 
controversy about their operation in particular states, especially in the first phases 
of contracting out. Critics cite examples of corporate malpractice, including 
inadequate and poor provision of services, misappropriation of funds and other 
financial	 irregularities	 (Berkowitz,	 2001;	 Freedman	 et al., 2002; Bryna Sanger, 
2003; DeParle, 2004). In some areas the organisations have lost contracts; in others 
they have taken remedial action and continue to deliver services. The corporations 
3 Annual state TANF plans provide detailed information on programme 
activities, financial data and performance against legislative objectives. HHS 
assesses and compiles this state data in an annual report to Congress. The 
US Office of Management and Budget is now independently assessing the 
performance of each federal programme using a ‘Programme Assessment 
and Rating Tool’. Broad results for TANF performance can be found at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003502.2005.html.
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themselves point to their successful delivery of contracts in many other areas and 
continue to stress the organisational and management capacities they bring to 
the market.
One consequence of these early controversies, however, is that local political 
opposition and legal challenges now undermine both the speed and effectiveness 
sought when using for-profit companies and such companies are now deterred 
from entering particular markets (Bryna Sanger, 2003, p.47). 
On a more general level the ‘welfare’ corporations have emerged as a powerful 
interest group, locally and nationally, lobbying, for example, for further privatisation 
of welfare services, such as Food Stamp and Medicaid eligibility. There are 
criticisms also of conflicts of interest and the ‘revolving door’ whereby politicians 
and administrators associated with welfare privatisation have been recruited by 
these corporations (Freedman et al., 2002). 
Involvement in the welfare market has had a major impact on non-profit 
organisations. In the early phase of welfare reform, prior to 1996, there was 
significant growth in the ‘non-profit human services sector’, especially in 
metropolitan areas (Twombly, 2001). The market continued to develop after TANF 
implementation but competition from private organisations and the emergence of 
prime contractors has had significant impacts. It has fuelled a more general concern 
about non-profit delivery in privatised social services and whether involvement 
in the welfare market would ‘force them to reconfigure their operations and 
organisations in ways that could compromise their missions’ (Ryan, 1999, p. 
134).
The evidence is mixed. A detailed study of larger non-profit organisations with 
major contracts found that some struggled with the challenge but others had 
improved their performance and ‘developed services consistent with their social 
mission’ (Bryna Sanger, 2003). They had comparative disadvantages, such as their 
restricted capacity to raise capital on financial markets, but they could raise funds 
from individuals and foundations that enabled them to compete and enhance 
their service provision. 
The experience of smaller non-profit organisations has been equally mixed. Many 
studies report how some have left, while others have equity and service quality 
issues due to the transition from grants to contract and performance incentives. 
Some, who provide specialised services, have been able to win contracts directly. In 
the states with prime contractors, smaller organisations frequently bid as partners 
or named subcontractors. The larger for-profit or non-profit organisations provide 
capital and management, financial and programme expertise, while the smaller 
community-based organisations offer specialised knowledge of particular client 
groups and credibility with hard-to-reach communities. One feature of non-
profit delivery is that their involvement has not appeared to generate the levels 
of opposition experienced by the for-profits (Winston et al., 2002; Bryna Sanger, 
2003). 
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There has been debate about the ‘shake out’ amongst community-based and 
small non-profits that accompanied the transition to a performance-based welfare 
market in cities like New York. For some the process has removed providers who 
were less effective, thereby improving services for clients. Others fear that clients 
with special needs may be less well served and have expressed concern about the 
loss of ‘assets that might not show up on a balance sheet’ but which contribute 
to the already limited social capital of poor communities (Fischer, 2001, p.1; Bryna 
Sanger, 2003).
Finally, there are few systematic studies of how non-profit or for-profit contractors 
deliver services. Case study and anecdotal evidence suggests they have different 
management styles and that staff employment conditions, incentives and training 
vary in important ways. McConnell et al., for example, report that for-profits 
appeared to work closely to the conditions of the contract and were driven by 
performance outcomes. In contrast, non-profit agencies were more likely to 
meet the needs of their clients despite their contract obligations. Stakeholders 
also often perceive a difference in programme approach suggesting that case 
management provided by nonprofits is more holistic than that of for-profits. 
McConnell et al., report, however, that they found ‘no conclusive evidence’ 
that ‘one type of contractor consistently provides better services than another’. 
Contractor performance reflected local demographic and economic context as 
much as organisational type (2003, p.25-26).
7 Case studies: welfare to work contracts in 
 Wisconsin and New York City
The following section offers more detailed consideration of the design of welfare 
to work contracts in Wisconsin and New York City and the providers that deliver 
them. Whilst these case studies are not representative they illustrate the challenges 
to ‘making markets’ in welfare to work delivery.
7.1 Wisconsin works – ‘W-2’
Wisconsin led the way in US welfare reform and was amongst the first to contract 
out its delivery of case management and other services. The Wisconsin ‘work 
first’ and ‘full engagement’ workfare model has been the source of much policy 
emulation in both the USA and in Europe. TANF caseloads have declined rapidly and 
by June 2006 there were only 10,109 ‘cases’ receiving assistance from Wisconsin 
Works, or W-2, which had replaced TANF cash benefits in 1996. Nearly 80 per 
cent of these cases were in Milwaukee.
The delivery of W-2 is contracted out to a mix of public and private agencies 
responsible for providing all services including cash payments to eligible 
participants. In 2005 the Wisconsin Department for Workforce Development 
(DWD) agreed contracts with 44 organisations to deliver services between 2006 
and 2009. In Milwaukee, W-2 has been delivered by private non-profit and for-
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profit contractors since 1997 but beyond the city W-2 continues primarily to 
be delivered by counties, either individually or in consortia. W-2 agencies make 
extensive use of subcontractors. DWD monitors the main contracts and its seven 
regional offices are responsible for monitoring subcontractors. 
There have now been five ‘RFPs’. The first four contracts were for two years’ 
duration; the most recent is for four years4. Wisconsin has used what is called a 
‘Right of First Selection’ (RFS) where contractors who meet specified performance 
standards face no competition when bidding for the next contract. RFS first enabled 
continuity for county agencies judged to be delivering TANF effectively but was 
subsequently extended to all qualifying contractors to reduce the disruption to 
services and transaction costs involved in competitive recontracting. There has 
since been some variation in the number of contractors awarded RFS status at 
each point of recontracting. Competition for those contracts not covered by RFS 
has largely been between existing providers, with little evidence of new entrants 
into the market. In Milwaukee the number of providers fell to three in 2005 after 
one major non-profit organisation had its contract withdrawn.
There has been no formal evaluation of the W-2 contracting process but state 
officials have described it as an ‘iterative process’ involving constant problem 
solving and policy changes (Bandoh, 2003). Much of this learning took place in 
the first two contracting periods when local officials and contractors were severely 
criticised by state auditors and advocates (Bryna Sanger, 2003; DeParle, 2004). 
The first contract (1998-99) was ‘an example of the potential for serious unintended 
incentives’ (McConnell et al., 2003, p.48). The contracts were cost-reimbursement 
but included a bonus that depended on the difference between actual costs and 
a specified maximum. If costs exceeded the maximum, the difference was the 
responsibility of the provider. If the provider spent less than the cap, however, 
it received a portion of the savings. Critics of the contract argued that it gave 
contractors the incentive to ignore clients or serve them less well. The contract 
generated controversy when large caseload reductions in Wisconsin resulted in 
significant windfall profits for the providers – in one case, more than $9 million. 
There was also lax control of the expenditure that did take place and of how 
contractors were operating (one was estimated to have spent $1.1 million on 
a marketing campaign). Several private agencies were also found to have been 
engaged in financial mismanagement and irregularities (LAB, 2005; DeParle, 
2004).
The criticisms of the contract led Wisconsin to completely overhaul its bonus 
provisions. From 2000 contract incentive payments have been limited to the 
4 This comprises Family Assistance which provides cash payments to those 
who qualify under TANF rules and Safety Net Assistance which is available 
for eligible low income households and those who exhaust their TANF 
entitlement (cash payments are limited to two years).
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achievement of specified performance measures rather than unspent funds. Under 
these cost-reimbursement contracts 80 per cent is paid during the programme 
with 20 per cent retained for performance bonuses paid at the end of the 
contract term. An agency is granted RFS if it meets minimum standards. It is paid 
restricted bonuses (which must be reinvested in purposes consistent with TANF) 
for reaching intermediate performance levels, and unrestricted bonuses for the 
highest performance levels.
The 2000/01 contract was shaped by a new programme emphasis on ‘informed 
choice’ (DWD, 2001). County employees were contracted with separately to 
provide initial assessments and information about services available before referral 
to a W-2 contractor. Staff at contracting agencies were required to attend DWD 
authorised training courses to ensure knowledge of programme objectives. 
Contractors were subject to increased ‘management and financial accountability 
expectations’, in areas of financial reporting, cost reimbursement controls and 
cost oversight.
In subsequent contracts W-2 funding levels have fallen faster than caseload 
reductions and contractors have frequently requested additional funding to 
pay for the more costly elements of service provision. Contract expenditure per 
participant declined from $1,001 in 1997/99, to $772 in 2004/05 (when cash 
payments to participants accounted for just under 40 per cent of expenditure). 
There is significant variation in the amount spent per participant by different 
contractors (LAB, 2005, p.17). 
A 2005 audit found that in 2004 more than half of participants had not been 
screened to identify barriers, a fifth of participants were not assigned to work 
activities and there was little incentive to ensure that more harder to place 
workfare participants moved into regular employment. A survey of leavers found 
that only 20 per cent earned more than the poverty level in the year after they 
left, albeit this increased to just over 40 per cent when tax credits were included. 
Job retention was a problem and over 40 per cent of leavers were employed by 
‘temp’ agencies (LAB, 2005).
The most recent W-2 contract introduced a new approach. The priority is now 
to ‘effectively connect low income individuals to the workforce’ by ensuring 
that participants ‘secure and retain jobs and advance in the workforce’ (DWD, 
2005, p.1). In Milwaukee case management and ‘job development’ have been 
contracted separately to encourage specialisation and to reduce reliance on too 
few contractors. W-2 agencies are under new requirements to integrate services 
with other workforce development and community support programmes.
The contract introduced strict limits on what providers can spend on ‘promotional 
events, telecommunication, executive compensation, legal services and retainers 
and rent’. Contractors are subject to more detailed service delivery-related 
obligations with poor performers at risk of financial sanction and, ultimately, loss 
of contract. The contract contains a mix of process and outcome performance 
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standards.	 The	 former	 continue	 to	 focus	 on	 factors	 such	 as	 caseload	 size	 and	
customer satisfaction (average score of 6.5 on 10-point scale for 10 different 
items). The outcome standards include wage at placement (new); employment 
within 60 days of skills training (new); job placement rate and retention at 30, 60 
and 180 days. 
Whilst W-2 has evolved to provide more education, training and barrier reduction 
services, community organisations and advocates remain concerned that contract 
incentives leave those with the greatest barriers without the services they need 
(LAB, 2005; Gardiner et al., 2007). 
7. 2 New York City – the role of prime contractors
New York City has the largest welfare population in the USA, in part because it 
has a more generous system of public assistance (PA).5 Radical welfare reform 
was implemented in 1996. The programme was partly modelled on the Wisconsin 
experience with a strong emphasis on ‘diversion’ and ‘full engagement’ in work 
activities. By March 2006 the caseload had fallen to just over 400,000, down from 
over 1.1 million in 1995. 
The significant organisational changes were implemented by the city ‘Human 
Resource Administration’ (HRA), responsible for delivering most income support 
benefits and related programmes. In 1998 it began converting local welfare 
offices into 30 jobcentres, reclassifying public sector officials as ‘Job Opportunity 
Specialists’, with responsibility for eligibility, case management and sanctions. Food 
stamp and Medicaid eligibility are determined in other public offices and WIA-
funded training services are now delivered through another network of Workforce 
Career Centres.
Job search, placement and work experience programmes are contracted out 
to private agencies. Until 1999 these services were delivered through multiple 
contracts	with	‘dozens’	of	local	non-profit	agencies.	By	early	2000	all	these	services	
were consolidated by HRA into 17 multi-million dollar ‘prime contracts’ awarded 
to 13 for-profit and non-profit organisations (Fischer, 2001). 
The initial contracts totalled ‘nearly half a billion dollars’ over a three-year period 
(Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, p.17). Instead of using a conventional RFP, officials 
undertook a ‘negotiated acquisition’ that enabled them to identify bidders, invite 
them to bid and shape contracts around provider strengths. The process was 
controversial and mired in legal and legislative challenges (Bryna Sanger, 2003, 
p.35). Subsequently, HRA used the ‘negotiated acquisition’ process to develop 
programmes for ‘special populations’. This involved 30 contracts, worth $128 
million, awarded exclusively to non-profits. The contracts provided ‘significant 
5 This comprises Family Assistance which provides cash payments to those 
who qualify under TANF rules and Safety Net Assistance which is available 
for eligible low income households and those who exhaust their TANF 
entitlement (cash payments are limited to two years).
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cash advances, more adequate funding and regularised reimbursements’ (Bryna 
Sanger, 2003, p.67). This was, in part, a response to criticisms of the lack of 
intensive services provided by the earlier prime contractors and the problems that 
nonprofit subcontractors were reporting.
The main prime contractors delivered either ‘Skills Assessment and Job Placement’ 
(SAP) or ‘Employment Services and Placement’ (ESP) services. SAP contractors were 
co-located in jobcentres and provided assistance during the first two weeks before 
an applicant received PA. SAP providers were paid standard fees for the initial 
assessment but mostly for job placements, 13 and 26 week retention, with more 
paid if the client earned enough wages to eliminate the need for public assistance 
(OC CNY, 2007). One study reported that SAPs were paid $250 per person to 
diagnose potential work barriers, with between $750 and $1,750 per person for 
placement and retention (Fischer, 2001, p.8).
When an applicant was awarded PA they were reassigned randomly by jobcentre 
staff to one of 11 ESP contractors. ESP provision commenced with a ‘rapid work 
attachment’ phase in the first two weeks, after which the individual spent two 
days a week with the ESP provider and three days a week on a mandatory Work 
Experience Placement (WEP), usually with a city agency (most notably the City 
Parks Department). ESP provision could include short training courses or mandatory 
treatment programmes. 
ESP providers were paid only for job entry and retention performance with similar 
milestones as those in SAPs (OC CNY, 2007). In the second contract period, for 
2002/05, the incentives were rebalanced to pay a higher premium on retention 
(see Table 1). This was introduced because contractors had been too willing to 
earn fees by placing participants in short-term jobs. The basic ESP programme 
also evolved to allow more participants to access support services, including basic 
education and training.
Table 1 ESP performance-based contract: sample milestone 
 payment rate 
 1999/2001 2002/2005
Placement:  $1964  $1227
13th week:  $1473 $2209 
 or high wage   $1964  $2700
26th week: $ 491 $ 491 
 or high wage and/case closed $1473  $1473
Maximum total  $5401  $5400
Source: Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, Table 3.
The use of prime contractors required a significant change in contract management. 
HRA could reduce its administrative load, relying instead on a new performance 
management information system. ‘Vendorstat’ was introduced in 2000 allowing 
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for immediate recording of job placement and attainment of payment milestones. 
Monitoring was reduced to the verification of placements and retention by quarterly 
audits of a sample of prime contractor cases, with follow up work only where 
discrepancies occurred. In effect HRA allowed prime contractors to play ‘the role 
of monitor’ in the system (Bryna Sanger, 2003, p.40). One paradox was that HRA 
administrative savings had to be offset by ‘higher paid staff with database and 
computer skills’ (Ibid, p.41). The city auditor has continued to criticise HRA about 
a ‘lack of consistent documentation on employment, work hours and wages’ (OC 
CNY, 2007, p.17).
In New York City the relationship between prime and subcontractors has been 
the subject of controversy, especially in the early period of transition when many 
providers found themselves relegated to subcontractor status (Biberman, 2001; 
Fischer, 2001). There were complaints about having to undertake new assessments, 
late payments and overly complex requirements that were ‘as excessive and costly 
as when they reported directly to the city’ (Bryna Sanger, 2003, p.69). A more 
fundamental issue concerned the structure of programme provision. Subcontractors 
were largely reliant for referrals on the prime contractor, by which time more work 
ready clients would have been ‘skimmed off’. Subcontractors highlighted that 
prime contractors controlled their cash flow, generally ‘top sliced’ an overhead 
charge, and had passed most risk to them (Youdelman and Getsos, 2005). 
On the other side, other subcontractors stressed that they had been able to access 
large contracts they could not bid for and they enjoyed some of the economies of 
scale and additional supports that prime contractors could deploy. One noteworthy 
innovation was the network of community-based providers affiliated to ‘N-PAC’ 
(Non-Profit Assistance Corporation) that won a prime contract. N-PAC does not 
deliver training or employment services but places all participants with its providers. 
It liaises with HRA, handles administrative and financial tasks, and provides 
information services and technical and programme assistance. The consortia was 
established	by	SEEDCO,	a	medium-sized	intermediary,	that	pools	public,	private	
and philanthropic funding and reduces financial risks for N-PAC members by 
basing its own payments only partially on performance (Bryna Sanger, 2003, 
p.59). SEEDCO has introduced related programme innovations, such as ‘EarnFair’, 
a temporary employment agency that provides employment opportunities for up 
to two years to welfare recipients and others from job placement programmes 
(see www.earnfair.com). 
In 2005, alongside a major review of New York’s poverty reduction strategy, it was 
decided to restructure welfare to work provision and to combine SAP, ESP and WEP 
provision into a single ‘Back to Work’ programme. Contracts were awarded to 22 
prime contractors that commenced in August 2006. Each contractor is expected 
to provide customised and flexible employment and work experience services 
and work with a client ‘from start to finish’ after handover in a jobcentre. The 
contractor must develop a ‘Job Retention and Career Plan’ for each participant to 
document their efforts to ‘advance’ the individual through skill development and 
financial planning. 
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Contractors receive only a nominal administrative payment for clients not placed 
in jobs and only partial payment for short-term job placements. The emphasis is 
on sustained jobs and career trajectories, with enhanced payments for the hardest 
to help and those who no longer need public assistance (Egglestone, 2006). The 
total annual funding for the HRA Works programme amounts to $63 million and 
contracts reward the milestones outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1  New York City HRA ‘Back to Work’ performance   
  milestones
 
Employment plans
•	 Completion	of	an	employment	plan	(pre-employment).
•	 Completion	of	an	employment	plan	(post-employment).
Unsubsidised employment
•	 Placement	into	unsubsidised	employment	for	30	days	(minimum	20	hours	
a week).
•	 Retention	in	unsubsidised	employment	for	90	days	after	initial	placement.
•	 Retention	in	unsubsidised	employment	for	90	days	with	case	closing.
•	 Retention	in	unsubsidised	employment	for	180	days	after	initial	placement	
Retention in unsubsidised employment for 180 days with wage gain.
Incentive/disincentive payments 
•	 Incentive	payment	for	a	decline	in	the	number	of	participants	who	have	failed	
to comply with work requirements and whose cases are sanctioned.
•	 Incentive	payment	for	an	increase	in	the	rate	of	sanction	removal.
•	 Disincentive	for	an	increase	in	the	public	assistance	recidivism	rate.
•	 Disincentive	 for	 a	 decline	 in	 administrative	 indicators	 (e.g.	 employment	
plan completion and timely attendance notification).
Source: Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, Appendix A.
The new delivery model responds, in part, to criticisms that providers placed 
few participants in sustained employment and that contract incentives did not 
encourage them to invest in the hardest to place (Youdelman and Getsus, 2005, 
p.3). Contractors now are expected to invest more in skills development and 
develop more effective links with the workforce development system. 
Critics emphasise, however, that the contracts do not reward placement in 
education and training or in intensive services (Sanghvi, 2006) and make no formal 
distinction between full- or part-time job placements (OC CNY, 2007). Others 
point to a continuing lack of coordination with workforce development agencies, 
even though both systems continue to ‘prepare customers for many of the same 
jobs, in the same citywide labour market’ (Fischer, 2007).
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8 Individual clients: customer satisfaction and    
 complaints
Most studies report that welfare agencies attach importance to the experience 
and opinions of clients. Many supplement their limited on-site monitoring of client 
experience with customer satisfaction surveys. One study found considerable 
variation in how such surveys were implemented and interpreted. They often took 
the form of short questionnaires distributed at service delivery locations. Response 
rates varied and contractors were critical that results often highlighted complaints 
over which they had no control (McConnell et al, 2003, p.55). In Wisconsin, 
and other states, however, such surveys now are implemented more rigorously 
and considered an important contractual performance indicator. Several welfare 
agencies also use ‘mystery shopper’ programmes, undertaken by independent 
organisations, to gain more insight into the experience of service users. Some 
carry out surveys with individuals who declined services or were sanctioned. These 
instruments not only provide important information on service delivery but may 
help agencies ensure that ‘creaming’ of ‘easier to serve’ clients is not taking place 
(Yates, 1998).
Contracts often require providers to agree individual service plans and meet 
minimum service standards. Providers and welfare agencies themselves are 
generally required to have complaints procedures in place to respond if services are 
unfairly denied to clients or those received are of poor quality. As problems have 
emerged with service delivery, new client-focused requirements and procedures 
have been introduced. In Wisconsin, for example, clients should now be informed 
of the services available so that they are able to make an ‘informed choice’, 
and contractors can be fined $5,000 per incident for failing to serve a recipient 
or applicant. The State Department has also recently created an independent 
Ombudsperson to more ‘rapidly address’ complaints from individuals who have 
problems in accessing W-2 services. In other states ‘hotlines’ have been introduced 
to more speedily respond to complaints and enquiries. 
Many of these changes have been driven in response to the legal and political 
challenges that welfare agencies and contractors have faced. Advocacy groups 
have played an important role in ensuring accountability, upholding the legal 
entitlements of service users and monitoring the ways in which private providers 
might not be delivering appropriate services or benefits (Freedman et al., 2002). 
Legal advocates used the courts to challenge the policies of welfare agencies, 
as in New York, on issues such as ‘due process’, the award of contracts, service 
eligibility, and access to education and training. These challenges, whilst often 
highly contentious, have contributed to the evolution and better governance of 
the welfare market. 
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Conclusion: policy implications 
This review has synthesised much of the published evidence available on the US 
welfare to work market. The findings suggest that the implementation process 
has been dynamic and that welfare agencies have had to frequently revise the 
terms of their contracts as problems have arisen and conditions have altered. 
The original work first and full engagement models changed as many states 
developed new support services, supplemented workfare with waged transitional 
jobs, and placed greater emphasis on job retention, skill acquisition and career 
development. Contract design too evolved, as in Wisconsin and New York City, to 
reward providers for securing these outcomes. These arrangements will change 
further as states adjust to recent changes in federal TANF targets.6
There may be no rigorous impact evaluation studies but there is now a developed 
body of US experience and ‘know how’ about different contracting models, 
the use of prime contracts and the relationships between service delivery and 
performance incentives. Many of the reports reviewed in this study analysed the 
‘lessons learned’ in the design and implementation of contracts and contain much 
detail that may be of practical assistance in the British context (see, for example, 
Yates, 1998; Winston et al., 2002; McConnell et al., 2003; Bandoh, 2003; Gardiner 
et al., 2007). 
Some of these ‘lessons’ and recent developments have relevance for developing 
the British welfare market:
1 Contractors and their frontline staff inevitably gain an advantage when 
implementing new contracts as they develop greater operational knowledge 
of how to achieve specified outcomes. The development of a performance 
payment system will involve an evolutionary process of trial and error and is likely 
to require an extended period of monitoring, evaluation and modification. It is 
also important that in addition to agreeing the delivery of specified outcomes 
contractors agree some general values that will help steer the behaviour of the 
contractor as they make use of the flexibilities they enjoy.
2 There is continuing tension between regulation, transparency and flexibility. As 
the Wisconsin experience illustrates, poor contract design and oversight can 
result in unintended outcomes. Subsequent redesign now has given Wisconsin 
increased control over the performance, governance and service delivery 
of contractors but this has reduced their freedom to innovate. The role of 
independent oversight is important as those with responsibility for policy and 
implementation have a clear interest in the ‘success’ of contracting out. 
6 TANF reauthorisation in the Deficit Reduction Act (2006) increased the 
proportion of the caseload to be engaged in ‘work’ to 50% and reduced states’ 
flexibility in using certain activities to satisfy the participation requirements. 
If states do not meet these requirements they will incur federal penalties.
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3 The US evidence illustrates the importance of contracting agencies 
independently monitoring client experience and ensuring that robust systems 
are in place to respond to complaints of unfair treatment and poor service 
delivery. In many contracted-out federal programmes-agencies must conduct 
customer satisfaction surveys and the results, as in Wisconsin, may be used as 
a benchmark performance indicator. These instruments are important both 
because they provide important information on service delivery and because they 
can militate against ‘creaming’ where job focused performance benchmarks 
might encourage contractors to deliver most to those clients easier to place.
4 There will need to be a significant investment in information systems and 
in contract negotiation and revision. This should include the continuing 
development of skilled contract managers. Contracts need to ensure that 
staff involved in service delivery have appropriate training and development 
opportunities so that they can discharge their responsibilities properly. 
5 The virtues of competition are difficult to sustain if there is competition only 
for contracts. Once a delivery market is established, incumbent providers enjoy 
acquired advantages. Contracting agencies face a difficult trade-off between 
the potential improvements that might be gained from a new contractor and 
the transaction costs and service delivery disruption that will arise when holding 
an open competition. The efficiencies of contracting should also be sought by 
creating effective competition between providers within markets. There is, 
however, scant evidence in the literature on how such competition is driven in 
the US welfare market, albeit New York City uses the data from its contractor 
information system to drive the performance of the prime contractors. There 
was little evidence also on empowering clients to exercise choice between 
different welfare providers.7
6 The use of prime contractors reduces administrative costs and generates 
economies of scale but, as the New York case study illustrates, this may be 
at the price of a loss of insight into service delivery, the experience of clients 
and of relationships between the prime contractor and its subcontractors. The 
viability and performance of subcontractors is important both for immediate 
service delivery and as a future source of competition for the prime contract.
7 There is a growing evidence base on the use of ‘vouchers’ in the workforce 
development system, especially the use of Individual Training Accounts (ITAs) 
and Personal Reemployment Accounts. ITAs are used by TANF clients and 
can assist them in acquiring skills as they enter and advance in the labour 
market. WIA evaluation studies were, however, beyond the scope of this 
review but may merit further investigation.
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7 There are risks attached to the significant involvement of for-profit organisations. 
They are likely to follow profit maximisation strategies shaped by contract 
incentives and this may not necessarily deliver what is best for clients, especially 
for those with greater barriers. Moreover, if the entry of for-profits into local 
delivery systems displaces existing private and public infrastructure, then future 
capacity may be at risk when market conditions change and larger for-profits 
remove their capital to seek greater profits elsewhere.
8 Developing and managing welfare markets is a complex and demanding task 
for administrators and managers. There is a sharp and continuous ‘learning 
curve’ and it takes time to learn how to steer the market to minimise perverse 
incentives and to capture the efficiencies and innovation that independent 
contractors can offer. As one US analyst observes, ‘successful contracting 
requires government to be smart buyers and good contract managers’ (Bryna 
Sanger, 2003, p. 27).
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Appendix 
Service integration
The case studies highlight that a significant challenge for policy makers, 
administrators and private contractors implementing programmes has been to 
coordinate separately funded TANF provision with workforce development and 
other support services, such as childcare, child support and child welfare. Wider 
studies report that, as in Great Britain, US categorical funding programmes and 
‘service system silos’ result in programmes that become self-contained, with 
administratively required, but unnecessary, barriers that result in individuals and 
families experiencing fragmented services and assistance (Lepler et al., 2006). 
Under the flexibility provided by the 1996 TANF legislation, some states developed 
programmes to deliver coordinated services, including co-location of welfare and 
workforce development services in ‘one stops’ (as in much of Wisconsin); blending 
of separate funding streams; the development of common application processes; 
and the use of common performance measures (Ranghelli, et al., 2003; Noyes and 
Corbett, 2005).8
8 The National Governors Association’s Center for Best Practices is developing 
an evidence base on ‘cross-systems innovation’ where states and local 
governments are attempting to further integrate TANF, workforce 
development and social service provision. See, for example, http://www.nga.
org/Files/pdf/0402CROSSSYSCAPACITY.pdf
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Two developments which impinge directly on performance measurement and 
contract design may merit further investigation:
1 The impact of federal ‘common performance measures’ of employment and 
earnings outcomes, applied to WIA programmes and now being ‘tracked’ 
for TANF. By minimising different reporting and performance requirements 
the aim of the measures is to facilitate service integration, reduce barriers 
to cooperation and enhance assessment of the comparative effectiveness 
of different programmes9. As this ‘whole-system’ approach to performance 
measurement beds in there may be valuable lessons in how such measures 
influence contract design, reduce duplication and stimulate ‘joined-up’ service delivery. 
2 The implementation of what are called ‘master contracts’. These are an 
administrative mechanism which involves a comprehensive agreement between 
a funding agency with responsibility for several categorical programmes (e.g., 
county, state or federal government) and a service delivery provider to deliver 
a more comprehensive, responsive and coordinated set of services. The ‘master 
contract’ allows commissioner and provider to align their funding and service 
delivery goals by combining multiple, uncoordinated contracts into a single 
agreement (see, for example, Lepler et al., 2006). 
9 See http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.cfm?DOCN=2195 and for 
TANF the section on Job Training Common Performance Measures at http://
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/olab/budget/2006/cj2006/sec4_02_perf_
anlys_2006cj.doc
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